Understanding Terrorism in America From the Klan to a1 Qaeda

Christopher Hewitt //

London and New York

First publ15hcd 3003 by Ro~~tlcclgc I I New Fetter Lane. London ECJP JEE

Simultaneo~lsly published in the USA and C~lnacla by Routledge 29 West 35th Street. New York. NY 10001

Typeset in Times by BC Typcsctting. Bristol Printcd and bo~ind in Great Britain by TJ lntcrnatlonal Ltcl. Padstow. Col-nwnll

All rifhts rcscr\cd. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or ~ltilised in any l’orm or by any electronic. mechanical. or other means. no\\ kno\\n or hereafter in\.entccl. including photocopying and recording. a r in ;in!. inlbrmat~on storage or rctricval system. without pcnuission in writing I’rom thc p~~blishers.

Briri.slr Lihrtrrj. Ctrilrlogrtir~g irr P ~ h / i ~ ~ r l i ~ f r D[il~i ,A cat:llogui: record Ibr this book is a\-~1i1;iblc I’rom the Brit~sh Library

Li i r rq~ . c?f’Cor~pr~~.ss Cc~rrrlogi~l: ill P~thlictrriotr Dtrr~r Hewitt. Christopher.

Lndtrstanding terrorism in America: I’rom the M a n to a1 Q L I L I ~ ~ ~ , Christopher He\\itt.

p. cm. – (Ro~itledge ~tudics in cxtrcmisn~ ~ ~ n d d e r n o ~ ~ ~ ~ y ) Inc1~1cii.s bibiiograph~cal refercnccs ; ~ n d index. 1. Tcrror~sm–L’n~txl States. 2. Terrorists-Cnitcd Statcs.

3. Radicalism-L-nitc St;~tch. I . Title. 11. Serii.2. Hl’h-132.H-LS 2003 -Xi.6’15 0973-Jc31 2002069S58

Dealing with terrorists

In the United States. until secently. terrorism was regarded as criminal matter. to be handled by the police, the FBI. and other la enforcement agencies. When caught. terrorists were tried in reg~11: criminal courts. and there was no special crime of “terrorism.” TI1 chapter first examines how terrorists ase killed os captured by polic tlien at how captured terrorists are treated by the criminal j u t i system. Law enforcement agencies have, on occasion. behaved in illepnl, ~lnconstit~ltional. and immoral ways. so this aspect of anti- terrorist policy will also be discussed. Finally. the effectiveness of mti- terrorist policies in stopping or reducing terrorism will be esamincd.

Killing terrorists

Police kill as well as capture terrorists. and the use ordeadly force by police is not uncommon. Table 6.1 shows the number of terrorists and estreniists. broken down by ideological type. who were killed bg law enforcement personnel. The agencies responsible for such killings were city police (forty-six). the FBI (seven). sheriffs’ departments (three). and state troopers (two). The table also shotvs the number of police killed by each group of terrorists. and it is interesting to nor? that the latter is similar ro (and ~lsruall\; slightly higher than) t l x number of terrorists killed by the police. This parity between the two kinds of fatalities suggests that the police response was p w r : \ l l ~ , pro- portional to t112 danger they faced. Most of those shot b!. police tver? killed n.hen police returned fire. or were apprehending suspects. or when indi~.iduals \yere behaving in a threatening manner.

There nsrz. ho\vever. u few occasions in \i.hich i t appears that police ambushed or xsassinated poliricnl ertrsmists. (The n ~ m ~ b e r of rime suspicious f~italities is shown in parentheses.) The only member of the

Drding \r.itlr terrorists 83

— Now Numhcrs in p,~rcnthczes ,Ire n~imbcrs oF suspic~ous L~l l~ngs by police

Klan ever killed by police, Kathy Ainsworth, was shot to death in a police ambush. when she and TRomas Tarr:tnts attempted to blow up a synagogue in Meridian MS. The ambush was set up by two Klansmen who had been bribed with money provided by the Anti- defi~mation League and the Mississippi Jewish comm~uni ty .~ In a pre- dawn raid by Cl-ricago police on an apartment occupied by Black Panthers. Fred Hampton and Mark Clark were Idled and four other Panthers were wounded. Although police claimed that the Pnntl~ers fired first. forensic evidence showed that only one shot was fired by the Panthers and more than eighty by the police (and also suggested that Hampton had been asleep \vhen he was killed). One other Panther. Bobby Hutton. was also killed under suspicious circumstances. After surrendering, he and Eldridpe Cleaver were ordered to run to the squad car. whereupon Hutton was gunned down by the police. Epstein (1971) concludes. after a careful reJie\\- of the e\~idehce. that these were the only t\vo cases \vhen Black Panthers \vex killed by police whose lives were not being directly threatened.’ In Puerto Rico. two i r r r r ‘ c ~ p r – ciistrrs n.ere a n ~ b ~ i s h e d b ~ . police on their n.a!. to bomb ~1 police station; the tn.0 men \yere accompanird by a police informant. ~ v h o had u r y d them to commit the act. and \\-ere gunned donm n.ithout \varning. The incident. u~hich became kno\vn as the Cerro Mara\.illa affair. \vas at first co\.ered up but then became a major issue in the 1984 elections and led to the defeat of the ruling Xen. Progressi\.e Purr) (Nelson 1986). During rhe Rub). Ridge siege of August 1992. Vicki L\.sa\.er was killed by an FBI sniper \\,bile she was holding her baby daughter. Her fourteen-year-old son. Sam. had been shot t\vo days earlier. Her husband. Randy Wzaver. was awarded S 3 million after Ivinning a w s o n ~ f ~ ~ l death suit against the Justice Department (Bock 1995).

Surveillance, harassment, and arrests

Law enforcement may engage in heavy surveillance or virtually ignore extremist groups. Arrests may be selective or extensive. In this section the differences in the overall response to different waves of extremist violence are examined.

After the incident in which fo~i r Puerto Rican nationalists opened fire on the House of Representatives in 1954, the government responded by arresting large numbers of nationalists both in the United States and in Puerto Rico itself. Of the 179 persons who were arrested, most were subseq~lently released. and only twenty-one were tried (Kersing’s 1954: 13683, 13898). After the robbery of n Wells Fargo depot in 1983 by the Macheteros, the FBI raided the homes of scores ofindepen- dence activists in P ~ ~ e r t o Rico. Thirty-seven ir~leperirlist(w were arrested and s~lbsequently released without charge, while those who werecharged spent over two years in pretrial detention. Although ninety days is the maximum period for preventive detention. it was not ~ ~ n t i l October 1986 that the US Court of Appeals ruled the continued pretrial deten- tion of the defendants was unconstitutionnl (Fernandez 1987: 241). Until disbanded in 1987, the Intelligence Unit of the Puerto Rican police relied on a vast network of informers to maintain dossiers on at least 135.000 independence supporters. Information in the so-called m p r r t s W ~ S used to deny jobs and otherwise discriminate against alleged subversives.’

There is general agreement that the Black Panthers were subjected to nationwide harassment by police, and a special unit was set up in the Justice Department to coordinate federal and local police efforts against them (Goodell 1973: 118). A survey by the Associated Press found that in the twelve months from May 1969 to May 1970. 230 Panthers had been arrested. and also that. of the cases m:hich had come to trial, only 10 percent resulted in convictions. According to Charles Garry, chief counsel for the party. fronl May 1967 to December 1969. 700 Panthers n.ere ch~u-gsd ~vith offenses ranging from murder and armed robbery to loiterins and possession of marijuana. I analyzed these 700 arrests (which are reported in the February 21. 1970. issue of the Bkich- Ptrnrher ne\vspaper). and foucd that about half (4s percent) \\.ere for ~.aguely defined or t r i~ i a l offenses such as disorderly conduct. loitering. passing out leaflets. etc.. which might be reasonably regarded as harassment. Another 17 percent of the arrests were for ordinary criminal acts. including armed robber!.. burglary. possession of stolen property. pimping. etc.. while 12 percent involved weapons possession. The remaining cases. in which Panthers were charged with machine-

gunning a police station. conspiring to bomb a police station. -I ni~lrder of police. etc.. were classified as political terrorism.

police raids on Panther offices were common. and those ~lrrested were often released without being charged. In 1969 Aone. there were

in San Francisco. Los Angelss. Chicago. Detroit. Denver. Salt Lake City, Indianapolis. San Diego. and Sacramento (Zimroth 1974: 82-5). The efkct of these arrests was to force the Panthers to spend their time raising money for bail and other legal expenses. thus divert- ing them Ssom p01itic;~l organizing. Also, since bail was often denied or set so high. the arrests served as a form of preventive detention, thus further weakening the organization. For example. in the case of the “Panther 31″ accused of conspiring to attack a New York police sta- tion, bail was set at S 100.000 for each defendant, which memt that most of them spent up to two years in jail, awaiting trial.

In some countries, anti-terrorist efforts involve mass searches of hos- tile areas, in which civilians are stopped at random. This has occurred in America on at least so171e occasions -all involving blacl<s. During the Death Angels’ reign of terror in San Francisco. police launched L ~ I I all- O L I ~ search throughout the black comn~unity, stoppins and questioning hilndreds of black men. Some individuals were stopped and asked for their identification us many as six times. The police invaded a movie theater. shone flxhlights on the audience. then pulled o ~ l t and searched halfa dozen blacks.’ After n New York City patrolman was ni~~rdered by the Black Liberation Army. Daley (1973: 418) describes how:

out in the street. 9th Precinct cops were stopping every black lilan they saw. They brought i n somethins like eight inen whom they had stopped and taken guns from. None of these men proved to ha\.e anything to do with the assassination. and none of the arrests would stand up in court. for they were the results of illegal search and seizure.

Police responded in a similarly indiscriminate fxhion in Cleve1:lnd and Billtimore after police ivere shot by black militants (Masotti 1969: 46).

While police action against Puerto Ric:~ns :lnd black militailts may be pla~lsibl!. attributed to racism. the W a n was also subject to hea\.y- hmded sur\-eillance by the FBI. Indced. ;IS George and Wilcos (1991) point out. most of ths techniqrlts used against black nlilitmts were first used against the Klan. Hoot.er boastsd of how lie de:llt with the White Knights of the Ku Klux Klan: ‘-There are -IS0 Klanmen in Tvlississippi. . . . I had our agents iutsr\.ie\v e x r y member of the Klan there. just to let them know we know ivho they are.” One account

describes how the FBI “mounted an eleven-week war of nerves. . . . Agents kept watch on Bowers [the head of the group] virtually around the clock” (“Malice towards some” 1966: 40).

After thc World Trade Center and Oklahoma City bombings. Congress granted incseased powers to the FBI. and the federal govcrn- ment adopted LI proactive policy aimed at preventing terrorist attacks by the su~.veillance of extremist groups. The goal is to uncover terrorist conspirncies while they are still in the planning stage. At the Justice Department, a tilsk force holds biweeldy n~eetings to evaluate intelli- gence seports and coordinate national strategy. Efforts have focused on two g ro~~ps . Islanlic fundamentalists and the far right. The new laws allowed the FBI to investigate individuals even if they were not suspected of any specific offense. Other laws. making i t a crime to send Inoney to foreign groups that the State Department classifies xi terrorist. and allowing the government to detain or deport immigrants suspected of ten-orist links, have been used almost excl~~sively against Muslim individuals and groups. Under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, the FBI carried out over 5.000 secret wiretaps during the 1990s. Civil libertarians are ~ ~ n h a p p y with the use of secret evidence in immigration cases. and claim that the FBI equates rhetoric with material support for terrorism. and that several of those prose- cuted are victims of guilt by association (“US Muslims scrutinized in terror probes” 1998).

Since the task force was set up in late 1995, FBI investigations of right-wing extremists have increased more than fourfold. These inves- tigations typically involve electronic surveillmce and the use of under- cover apents (Klaidman 1996). The number of right-wing extremists arrested has increased dramatically. with almost 300 being charged n.ith various offenses since 1979. This f i g~~re (which is based on my o\vn data set) is certainly an undercount. but what is striking is that over a third of those arrested had not yet committed any violent acts. Anecdotal evidence suggests that known right-wing extremists are under jur\.eillance and harassed by police.”

What is striking about contemporary law enforcement acti\.ities directed against right-wing estrenlists is the involve~nent of self- appointed watchdog groups such as the Anti-defitmation League (.4DL) and the Southern Po~.erty Law Center (SPLC). These groups monitor racist and antisemitic groups and then share their information with 1a\v enforcement agencies. thereby ,aii.ing go\trnment asencies a rationale for infiltrating the groups n.hich they would otherwise have lacked. The .\DL has lobbied for the passage of hate crime laws. and many states have adoptctd the XDL nlodel statutes. which create new

subst~tntive offenses of “intimidation” and “institutional vandnlism” and res~dt in more severe punishments for existing crimes. morris Dees. the founder of the SPLC. has made creati\,e use of the comn~o~ i – law principle of “\.icarious liitbility” to bring ci\.il s~iits ag~iinst national white separatist organizations on behalf of the victin~s of racist attacks. In 1987 Dees bankrupted the Alabama United Wans of Anlerica ~vith a $7 n~illion judgement for the family of Michael Donald, who was mur- dered by Klunsmen. In 1990. after skinheads beat to death M~ilugeta Seruw, Dees won a $12.5 million punitive damages settle~nent against White Aryan Resistance. In 1997 a $1 million judgement was han+ci down against two Klan groups after Lin intcn-acial march in Georgia was stoned. i n I998 a South Carolina j~11.y ordered two I<lan chapters to pay $37.8 million – the largest-ever award in a hate crime case – for creating an atmosphere of hate that led to the arson of a black church. Most recently, a woman and her son were awarded $6.3 n~illion against Aryan Nations leader. Willianl Butler. because his security guards assa~ilted two passing motorists after their car backfired.’ The result of this litigation was to bankrupt and silence these organizations. which was Dees’s declared intent.’

One might argue that, in all the previously described cases, society responded vigoro~isly – and in some cases overreacted – to m~tjor out- breaks of politically motivated violence. In other cases. however, the authorities were criticized for ignoring the violence or for not putting enough effort into stopping it. Abortion rights groups accused the Reagan administration of downplaying anti-abortion violence. when William Webster. the director of the FBI. refused to classify clinic bombings and arson as terrorism on the grounds that there was no evidence of an org:tnized conspiracy. Subsecluently. however. it would be difficult to make such an argument. The Freedom of Clinic Entrances Act of 1994 criminalized many anti-abortion protest tactics. The National Organization of Women successf~tlly used the Racketeer Inf u<nced and Corrupt Organizations statute (originally devised as a weapon ag ins t organized crime) to sue the leaders of Operation Rescne and the Pro-life Action League. Jurors awarded SS6.000 to the two abortion clinics on whose behalf the suit had been brought. In 3001. a federal appeals court unanimously ~tpheld the judgemznt. saying the denlonstrators had gone beyond free speech \vhen they “trespassed on clinic property and blocked access to clinics tvith their bodies. at times chaining themsel\-es in the doorwa!.~ of clinics or to operating tables.” In 1999. an anti-abortion web site. the “Nuremberg Files.” was closed don-n on the grounds that it encouraged attacks on abortion doctors. Abortion rights groups deno~~nced the site as a “hit

88 Denlirg with tei.r.uri.sts

list” that incited violence against abortion clinics. and in a civil suit abortion providers won a $107 million settlement tiom a Portland OR jury in 1999. Two years later, a federal appeals court overturned the award. and ruled unanimously that the internet site was protected speech. The court concltided that “Political speech may not be punished just because it makes it more likely that someone will be harmed at some unknown time in the future by an unrelated third party” (Sanchez 200 1 : A I ) . Kaplan ( I 995) describes the harsh treat- ment of anti-abortion demonstrators by police and courts. Deinonstra- tors have experienced extreme police brutality both when being arrested and when in jail. Heavy damages have been levied against them for trespassing.

The police were noticeably unsuccessf~il initially in dealing with Cuban c h i g c ; terrorism. One article claims that Cuban terrorism “constitutes a monumental (and peculiar) failure on the part of US investigative agencies. Eighty percent of the 100 and more bombings and killings in the Miami area since 1974 remain unsolved” (“Cuban exiles: Miami, haven for terror” 1977: 326). The FBI’s inability to apprehend the white radicals of thz 1960s was also commented on. According to an article in the Nut Yo& Times ,Il/lc~g~irze, “Whatever its record with ordinary criminals, the FBI isn’t too hot at catching the new breed of fugitive” ( L ~ ~ k a s 1970). The white revolutionaries were difficult to catch for several reasons. They were college-educated. and could rely on a well orpanized and well financed network of supporters. This radical underground was dil’ficult for the FBI to pene- trate. due to the cultural gap between their agents and the student radicals.” In the case of the Jewish Defense League. the New York Police Depart~nent seems to have been remarkably unconcerned about the threat it posed, although tht police did infiltrate two officers into the group (Rosenthal 2000). After the murder of Alex Odeh. an official of the American-Arab Anti-discrimination Committee. appar- ently by JDL members, there were con~plaints that the case was not being investigated vigorously. The FBI. however. clai~ned its investigu- tions into this case and other bombings were hampered because n ~ m y of the suspects had fled to Israel. and the Israelis were not cooperating with the FBI (Kurtz 19S7).

Lack of success is not necessarily a result of lack of effort. sincz terrorist crimes are in many respects more difficult to solve than normal crimes. and some kinds of terrorists may be more difficult to catch. Table 6.1 givzs. for each ideological category. the number of terrorists brought to trial and compares this !{.ith the seriousness of

Tddc 6.3 Mod iniportunt factors involved in the capture of terrortsts (‘%)

Inli~rmrss mcl inliltra~ors 46.4 Surveillance 29.7 C ; ~ ~ l y h t in lllr act 23.5 Routine policing 7.5 1111 cstipnlion 14.7 Inlbsmation from public 8.5 Fellow ter-resists 3.4

time when it sipposedly had less than 500 members. The murderers of three civil rights workers were identified by a nien~ber of the police department who joined the Klan in April 1064, and becane an FBI informer in September. The key witness in the case was a former Klans- man. who told the FBI what he knew for $3.000, plus $100 a week for the following year. The murderers of Violet Liuzzo were convicted on the testimony of Thomas R o w . Jr. a Klansinan who had been on the FBl’s payroll for six years.” The murder of Willis Brewster, a black inan randomly shot to death. so shocked the town of Anniston that the local newspaper and civic leaders raised over $20.000 for informa- tion on his killers. Three men were subsequently indicted (Bullard 1989: s4-5).

Black proups werz heavily infiltrated by police agents. One Panther complained how “the problem wirh most of these underground organi- zarions was that the FBI and police were ~mderground with them. When they surfxed to perform some revoli~tionary act. it was usually a setup. and the members of the org:lnizntion were busted” (Anthony 1990: 26). When the New York chapter of the Black Panthers w;ls started. undercover police were among the founding members. and six ~ q e n t s from the Bureau of Special Services of the NYPD gave evidence dur-ing the trial of the Panther 21.”

One of the agents. Ralph White. had joined the party before any of the defendants. White Lvas thsri: \\:hen the two Panthers \vliose job it had been to plant a bomb in the 44th Precinct stashed d~.namite behind a refri$erator a t the Elsnxre Tenants’ Council. a Bronx anti- p o l m y agency. He took the d!.mmite to police headquarters. where the bomb squad substituted clay and oatmeal for i t . thn.arting the 44th Precinct bombin: before it took place. Another agent. Eugene Roberts. “so trusted by the Panthers that he penetrated their security section. was sent out xvith another P:lnther to find the best places

Dedi iy with terrorists 91

plant firebombs in four big New York City department stores” ~~tc l lucc i 1986: 41–3). Informants often identitied suspicious vehicles or addresses for sur- lance. or tipped off police tha: something was going to happen. s allowing a slakeout to be set up. After 3 tip Crom an inii>rmer. New Afrikan Freedom Fighters were placed under intensive FBI

rveillmce. For nine months, the g r o ~ ~ p wits witched by up to 100 ents 3 day, and over 500 phone conversations were taped (Larsen

1985). In their efforts to capture Puerto Rican terrorisls, FBI agents “follo\ved the revolutionaries by wiretapping their cars. wiretapping their apartments, wiretapping the public telephones in front of their honxs. and even wiretapping people when [hey made love in the shower” (Fernandez 1957: 245). Such wiretaps are obviously costly in terms of money and manpower. For example, the wiretaps on the Mutula Shakur group Wtimately cost $3 million, involved fifty agents, and lasted 169 days” (Castellucci 1956: 261 ). The investigation of the Macheteros, who robbed the Wells Fargo t r ~ ~ c k . cost $8 nillion – more than the money taken in the robbery itself.

Lnrsc n~imbers of individuals were caught by police in the act of comn~itting terrorism. or while fleeing the scene. Such cases often over- lap with. and are difficult to distinguish from, routine policing. Larry Pla~nondon. a White Panther leader. and two companions were stopped by a sheriff’s deputy after throwing beer cans out of their car. .A quick check through the National Crime Inforination Center identified two of them and the car was stopped for a second time. by state police (Newton and Newton 1991). Two members of the MI9 Communist Organization. responsible for the I981 Brinks robbery, were arrcsted after ~i police officer thoiyht they looked suspicious while unloi~ding their truck at a public storage facility. A subse- quent search of their storage bin turned up a cache of Lveapons and explosives.

Under the heading of investigation are inclrtded arrests made as a result of searches. questioning \vitnesses. matching and checking records. Sometimes terrorists leave clues. whereby the!. can be traced through diligent police ii:ork. 111 describing how a member of the Black Liberation Army mas apprehended. a police spokesman said. “There was no miracle connected n.ith our finding him – i t n – x just dog nark. We checked out everything. Sonxbodg. said the); s3n. him playing basketbail in Brooklyn. Somebody else heard he \vaj at a social club. We checked out everything” (Kaufnlan i973: 10). -4 sspeed- ing ticket and a f~llie dri\.ing license allo\ved the police to link together sei-era1 nlenlbers of the BL.4 M19CO alli~lnce. and also led to the

92 Decding 1r.ifl1 terrorists

discovery of their safe house. Patti Hearst and the survivin~ members of the Symbionese Liberation .4rmy were tracked down after police identified a red Volkswagen which had been parked outside a Pennsyl- vania farmhouse which had been occupied by the fugitives. One parti- cularly impressive example is provided by the capture of the Macheteros. who robbed a Brinks truck in Hartford CT. They were caught after the group had tired an antitank rocket at the federal build- ing in Hato Rey. Puerto Rico. The abandoned getaway car was searched and, although it was registered under a fi~lse name and address, and had been wiped clean of fingerprints, a traffic ticket was f o ~ ~ n d , squeezed into a side poclcet. It was matched with a false driver’s license. and the photograph on the license matched a man already under surveillance. He was then followed and led FBI agents to the rest of the cell (Fernandez 1987: 224-5). The robbery of an armored truck in Ukiah WA by the Order was solved in a similar fashion. A pistol left behind at the scene by one of the robbers was traced back to the gun shop where i t had been sold. The buyer was identified, then all phone calls to the Montana-Idaho area from the motel (where he had stayed for the three days prior to the robbery) and nearby pay phones were traced. This linked the robbery with known members of Aryan Nations and other extremists. Searches of their hon~es turned up other names (Flynn and Gerhardt 1989: 261-5).

One fugitive, Joseph Cowan. suspected in a nationwide bombing conspiracy, was arrested after a fellow worker recognized him from newspaper and television pictures. and phoned the FBI. Marilyn Buck was arrested when buying guns for the BLA. after she gave two different names to the alert owner of a San Francisco gun store, who promptly notified the BATF (Castellucci 1986: 81). Ted Kaczinski. the unabomber. was turned in by his brother.

Under interrogation. crimi~ials often turn in their cohorts in the hope of receiving more lenient treatment. Ideologically motivated indi- viduals are less likely to do this. but some do. Three Klansmen. who had murdered a black army reserve lieutenant colonel. were implicated by another Klansman. who confessed under questioning. One anti- abortionist who was imprisoned without bail while awaiting trial for bombing an abortion clinic expected his pastor to sze that his ~vife and children were taken care of during his incarceration. When the pastor suggested that the family go on welfare. the bomber agreed to testify for the state. and wore a wire in order to record several hours of conversation which incriminated the pastor in the bombing (Blanchard and Prewitt 1993: 103).

Deding ~b.irh terrorists 93

Terrorists in the criminal justice system

After the terrorists are caught, the prosecutors must decide what to charge them with. juries must decide whether to convict them of the charges, and if they art: convicted judges nlust decide what sentences to impose. If the data were ideal, we could evaluate the effect of all these factors, case by case. However, i t is still possible to discern some general patterns in how terrorists are treated compared wit11 other criminals, and to compare different groups of terrorists to see whether certain groups are treated in a relatively harsh or lenient fashion.

Our sources identify 1,775 individuals suspected of terrorist crimes, in that they were arrested or so~ight by the police. Of these, 8 died while awaiting trial, 54 remained fi~gitives, 71 were awaiting trial, and in 116 instances, although the individuals were convicted, their sentence is unknown. For 852 individuals, the criminal justice outcome is reported. This leaves over 600 people who were arrested, but for whom no inforniation as to their criminal justice outcomes is avail- able.14 This discrepancy is probably explained by the fact that most of those arrested were reieased withont being charged. I assume that the cases in my data set, for which the criminal justice outcomes are known. constitute both the great majority of cases brought to trial, and a reasonably representative sample. The distribution of the known criminal justice outcomes is shown in Table 6.4. (Some indi- viduals were tried more than once. so the total outcomes number 891. not 852.)

Several factors affect criminal justice outcomes. The low rate of con- viction for black defendants sho\vn in Table 6.5 probably reflects thc fact that prosecutors appear to have “overcharged” black militants. and hence prosecuted some individuals when the evidence against them was too weak to obtain a conviction. Smith (1994: 178) points

Td’trhle 6.1 Criminal justice outcomes of all knon n cases ( O 0 )

Charges dropped d~snl~sssd 9.5 Acqu~tted ~erdlct o\srturned 16.3 X l i ~ t i ~ ~ I 7.2 StLite’s s l idence 0.8 F ~ n r conmunlr~ senice. etc. 3.9 Prob,~tion suspended azntznce 8.7 Pr~son bzntence 52.2 Death sentznce 1.2

out that this strategy “is commonly used to elicit a guilty plea on some counts in exchange for dropping numerous extraneous counts.”

The composition of the J i ry may h~lve played a role in the outcome of some trials. The first Black Panther trial before a predominantly black jury. and presided over by a black judge, resulted in the acquittal of twelve Panthers charged with the attempted murder of five New Orleans police oflicers. A Purrto Rican Jury acquitted Filiberto Ojeda Rios. who had shot and blinded an FBI agent during his arrest, of all charges against him. Two trials of the BLA gunmen who shot a policeman to death ended in mistrials. apparently because of racial feelings on the part of the predominantly black jury. Southern juries were often biased and reluctant to convict Klansmen and others xcused of racist attacks. even if the evidence indicated that they were g~~i l ty . This was especially apparent in the more serious cases. such as murder cases. and Byron de la Beckwith bragged that “no southern jury would ever convict a white man for killing :I nigger.” C~~rrent ly, pre- dominantly white juries do not seem to display any general sympathy for right-wing terrorists. although there have been some instances. For example, two years after the Ruby Ridge shoot-out. an Idaho jury found Kevin Harris and Randy Weaver not g ~ ~ i l t y of murdering US Deputy Marshall Williml Deegan. and also fo~lnd Wearw not guilty of selling illegal shotguns – the offense which had provoked the whole incident. In 1981 in Chattanooga. of three Klansmen charged with shooting five elderly black women. two were acquitted by an all- white jury and one received a nine-month jail sentence.

Once convicted. it is possible tlxit judges may sentence different types of terrorists differently. In the only previous study to eramine this

Tnhle 6.5 Cr~mindl just~ce outcomes. by group tdeology

Irlrolog~ 411 o f f ~ w w \ Derlrlh o f f rmr \ ‘ , I ~ 0 1 1 1 l ~ f c r l 1 1 1 “0 L U I I I I L I L ~ ‘I1 1

Anrl-‘~bort~on 100 0 (-32) 100 0 (3) Purrto Rlcms 91 3 (53) 1000 (3) R~ght~sts 87 6 ( 2 1 7 ) SOS (52) C ~ ~ b m s 85 : (21) 20 0 ( 5 ) Lzft-it ~ n g 70 6 (S5) 1000 (30) Jzn i h 69 2 (39) 20 0 ( 5 ) B l ~ k inillrants 5 1 1 (26s) 75 -1 ( 1 1s) Klan 1 7 S (180) 18.7 (87)

issue. Smith (1994: 180). after analyzing the sentences of those identi- fied as terrorists by the FBI in the lC)SOs, fo~und that “there is little variation in thc sentences gi\.cn white and non-white terrorists. The average sentences given these two groups ciifTzred by less than one year. Similarly, left- and right-wing terrorists, on average. received almost identical sentences (233 months and 224 months. respectively).”

In this stction. a similar mulysis is c:~rsied out on a lilrger sample covering ;I longer time period. Since prosccutorial discretion is so great, the analysis controls for what the terrorists did rather than for what they were charged with. For example, two nienibers of the Symbionese Liberation Army. Bill and Emily Harris. Itere tsied for kid- naping. because alter a robbery they jumped into ;I car and drove nwoy, taking the owner of the car hostage. Victor Gereua and the other Macheteros involved in the Hartford Wells Fargo robbery were charged with f o ~ r separate c o ~ m t s of robbery, since the money belonged to four different banks.

In comparing the sentences handed out to different types of terror- ists, four kinds of terrorist acts are distinguished. Those resulting in a Satality are considered separately from non-fatal incidents. while the non-fatal incidents are divided into three categories: bombings and arson. shootings. and robberies. Table 6.6 shows the avera, ue sentence received by different types of terrorists when a fatality resulted from the incident. while Table 6.7 compares the sentences handed down if no fatalities occurred.

Since courts are allowed to consider “uncharged and unconvicted conduct at sentencing,” and the activities of the group its ;I whole. some variation between and within ideological categories is appro- priate. For example, the higher than average sentences received by the

Tithlr 6.6 Average sentence In ~ncicients with fxt:rlity. by terrorrst rdsolog,.! (4ean)

Rightists 66.2 Anii-abortionists 50.0 Puerto Ricans 19.7 Black nlilit;~nts 37.0 Leftists 31.0 Cuban5 30.0 Whits racists Klan 17.0

Average. 311 cases 47.2

96 Deding ~r.ith terrorists

Tcihlc 6.7 Average sentence In ~nc~dents w ~ t h no fatnlitles. by terrorist ideology (years)

Bo/d7i/1g/ Sl~ootitrg Rohher~ Arson

Puerto Ricans Leftists Rightists Anti-abortionists Cubans White racists/Klan Jewish Black militants

Average, all cases

Note ” Fines only.

Puerto Rican indepe~z&.srrrs for the Wells Fargo robbery were certainly affected by the fact that they were n~en~bers of the Macheteros. a group that had gunned down American sailors in Puerto Rico. Indeed. the apparent harshness of the sentences imposed on almost all the Puerto Ricans presun~ably reflects the fact that they deliberately attacked both high-ranking members of the government and innocent civilians. The political climate – and the social attitudes of the judges – also seem to affect the treatment of some groups. Ten men found guilty or bomb- ing sixteen black churches and homes in McComb were given suspended sentences by a Mississippi judge, who said that they had been ‘.provoked” and were ‘young men starting out in life.” Two white teenagers who gunned down a thirteen-year-old black boy in Birmingh~lm AL were sentenced to seven months in prison. but released after a fen- days. and warned not to ha1.e another “lapse.” The mem- bers and even the leaders of the Weather Underground were treated nit11 remarkable leniency. Bernardine Dohrn \vas sentenced to proba- tion and fined S1.500. with the judge turning down a prosecution request that she serve a nominal thirty days in jail because “she had suffered enough through her years in hiding separated from her family and friends.” Cathlyn Platt Wilksrson. another leader. was freed after serving less than a y2;ir of her sentence – even thouph she had been con~.icted in connection with an explosion tvhich killed three people. In this case. the judge thought that “no useful purpose ~vould be served by her further imprisonment.” Jeffrey Jones. whose apartment was described as a bomb fi~ctory, pleaded guilty to a

Dealing \~*itl? terrorists 97

charge of “manufacturing a bomb” and was placed on probation. and ordered to perform volunteer work in a day care center. A group of Weathermen who sniped at a police station in Cambridge MA were fined a total of $700. The treatment of members of the Jewish Defense League was also remarkable, given that they were responsible for at least three murders, and numerous bombings. Yet they were rarely prosecuted and received light sentences even when convicted. For example, one JDL member who bombed an Arab activist’s home in 1972 was given three years’ probation.

On the other hand, the treatment of anti-abortionist violence has tended to be extremely harsh. J o l ~ n Salvi. despite being obviously mentally ill, was sentenced to two life terms without parole for his part in the deaths of two abortion clinic receptionists.” Shannon Price, who fired a shot at an abortionist. was charged with attempted murder. Despite the fact that no one has ever been injured in any abor- tion clinic bombing, those convicted have received an average sentence of almost eight years, and many have received heavy fines in addition to their sentences. Fines. ranging from $1.500 to $357,073, were imposed in ten cases, with the average amount imposed being $158,983.

In only a handful of cases was the most extreme penalty handed down. In addition to Timothy McVeigh, nine other right-wing terror- ists have been sentenced to die (although only two have actually been executed). The only other terrorists condemned to death were Oscar Collazo. the Puerto Rican nationalist who killed a guard outside Presi- dent Truman’s residence. Fred Evans, the leader of the Black Nation of New Libya. which was involved in a shoot-out in Cleveland, and Paul Hill, who murdered an abortionist.

Stepping over the line

Although vigorous law enforcement against terrorists is generally approved. certain methods are not considered legitimate in a demo- cratic society. In some countries. death squads hunted down suspected terrorists and terrorist sympathizers. suspects were brutally interro- gated or tortured. and legitimate acti\.ities by radical groups disrupted through “dirty tricks.”

D ~ ~ r i n g the 1960s. the FBI developed the notorious Counterintelli- gence Progran~ (COINTELPRO) against the Klan. At least 3 9 actions against white racist groups were carried out during the period. “most of them invol\:ing cheap psychological warfare and dirty tricks. . . . Agents leaned on Klansmen’s employers. and a number of Klansmen lost their jobs” (Wade 1987). The FBI also tried to intimidate individual

98 Dealing i~.itll terrorists

Klansmen. and to provoke splits within the Klan organization. The murder of Vernon Dahmer by the K K K was solved after one of the KI:insmen confessed and implicated himself and seven other Klansmen. According to one account, the confession was beaten out of him by a New York nyfioso, Gregory Scarpa, who was brought in by the FBI.'”

It has been noted that many of the tactics used against the Klan were also used against black militants a Sew years later (George and Wilcos 1992). Docunicnts released under the Freedom of Information Act revealed that, t l ~ r o ~ ~ g h 1971. there were 395 FBI operations against black groups, including 233 against the Black ~ m t h e r s . ” The FBI fomented a war between the Black Panthers and Ron Karenga’s US organization that led to several deadly shoot-outs between the two groups. In addition. undercover agents set the Panthers up by planting drugs and weapons in their homes and in BPP ot’fices. In order to dis- credit the Panthers. the FBI forged and distributed thousands of copies of a “Black Panther Coloring Book.” containing pictures of young black children attacking policen~en with knives. “to the horror of many black leaders, who . . . began to dissociate themselves from the Panthers” (Volkman 1980: 156).

In Puerto Rico in the I960s, on Hoover’s orders, the FBI deliberately disrupted the ~tctivities of the nationalists. Hoover suggested “the use of informants to disrupt the movement and to create dissension within the groups . . . [and] the use of handwritten letters to plant the seeds of suspicion between various factions.” As part of their campaign. agents sent anonymous letters containing sexual gossip about Juan Mari Bras. the leader of the Puerto Rican Independence Party. to party members (Fernandez 19S7: 54). In the 1980s. it is itlleged. a secret police unit. trained and artned by the FBI and the US Marshal’s Office. carried out a series of political murders with the aim of destroy- ing the independence movenient. Three iir~1qm~tli.vtu.s vanished and are believed to have been killed by the “Defenders of Democracy.” The group also bombed the offices of the Puerto Rican Bar Association. in an attempt to deter lam.yers from defending ftlrle[?enr!i.rrr/.s. and arrested nationalists on trumped-up charges and faked evidence.lS

Measuring the effect of counterterrorist measures

Having described what has been done against terrorists. the impact of these measures xvill now be examined b ~ . studying three cases of terrorism: b ~ : black militants. by Puerto Rican i1rt/c>1~e11(/i.~tns. and by the contemporary far right. Two outcome measures are used: the total number of terrorist incidents annually (except in the case of the black

Dcnlrrlg n ith teworisrs 99

niilitants. where the six-month totals are usedl and the total number of Incidents. ue~ghted accordmg to se] ent) The se\eritj of an lnc~dent is scored b! nddmg the number hlled or V, ounded There are tno general theones as to hon Ian enforcement and the courts reduce crme. the attritton model and the pun~shment deter~ence model

T/w N ~ I I I I I O I ~ 1110de1 Most tel ror~st olganlzdtlons are qulte small. Hence ~ f d s ~ g n ~ f i c a ~ ~ t n~1111br31 of terro~-~sts are hilled or captured. tt IS reasonable to assume that the orgctnlzatlon \\111 cease to emt . or at Ie’~st that ~ t s acti\ities \\ill decl~ne The extent to nh~cl i a t t r ~ t ~ o n tAes its toll of the human capital of a group is estimated b). calculating the c ~ ~ m u l a t i ~ e total of thoss arrested and or killed. The number of extremists arrested in each year is also coded. These may be o-c.erl!’ simple measures of the impact of arrests. since not all terrorists are equally va1u;ible to the g o u p . Losing key personnel, such as leaders or skilled bomb makers. ma); 11a1.e an esprciall\. severe impact on a group’s abilit!. to Lvqe terrorism. 711~. pimishi7lrn1 ~lrorlcl. The rationale for punishing terrorist crimes

severely is that i t serves as a deterrent to others. As noted previousl!-. terrorists do receive harsh sentences – usually greater than those meted out for co~nparable crimes committed by non-terrorists. The magnitude of punishment is calculated as tlie total years of sentences handed down to group niembers in each period. Since a death sentence sends an especially powerful message – and an execution an even stronger one – death sentences and executions are coded separately. It is arguable that the number of extremists killed by police serves not only as an aspect of personnel attrition. but also as a form of punishment – a pseudo-execution. The assumption is that the effect of all rhese punishments will be immediate – and will reduce terrorisn~ in the same year 01- the following year.

The first step is to see whether there is any significant correlation between the law e~i force~~~ent !c~- i~ i l i i~~~l justice measures and the level of terrorist violence in the same year. The results are shown in Table 6.8. 0111y those correlations that are significant at t l ~ 0.05 level are given. The cumulative nun~ber arrested vasiable (and tlie cumula- tive number wrested and killed variable) are both significantly and negatively correlated with Puetto Rican terrorism.'” In the case of both black terrorism and white racist terrorism. there is no con-elation wit11 cun~~ la t i ve arrests, but these is a very liigh correlation with tlie nulnba- of arrests. Total sentence years and death sentences are both linked ~vith fluctuntions in white racist terrorism. As regards black terrorism. the ~ i ~ i n l b ~ r of mi1it;lnts killed by police is positi\,ely cosre- laied with the numher and se\;erity of terrorist incidents.

100 Decrling with terrorists

TLMC 6.8 Same-year correlations between terrorist countermeasures and terrorist incidents

— —

Puerto R u n s

Arrest5 – – Sentences – – Cum~~lative arrests -0.482 -0.465


Arrests t0.630 Sentence5 – Killed by police +0.64:! Cum~ilat~ve arrests –

White racists

Arrests – +0.505 Sentences – +0.767 K~lled by police – – Death sen~ences – +0.572 Cu~nulat~ve ‘lrrests – –

Note Correlations shown only if sign~ficant at >O 05 Ioel

These results can be interpreted as follows. The Puerto Rican case serves as a good illustration of the attrition model. A high-ranking FBI official (Monroe 1983: 146) noted that “one of the reasons for the FALN’s relative inactivity [since 19801 was the arrest and convic- tion of several of their members.” Similxly. Hoffnmn (1986: 4) attrib- uted the sharp decline in Puerto Rican terrorism in 1985 to “the continuing success achieved by the FBI as well as local law enforce- ment agencies in tracking dorm and arresting wanted and suspected terrorists.” The correlation between cumulative arrests and Puerto Rican terrorism shomm in Table 6.5 pro\-ides statistical support for these judgements. (See also Figure 6.1 for a graphic illustration of the association between the tnro \.ariables.) The FXLN is estimated to have had about fifty members and the Macheteros probably had about the same number. Thus by the mid-19SOs both groups had lost a considerable proportion of their strength. The impact of the arrests was heightened by the fact that those arrested included two of the leaders (Torres and Lopez) and William Morales. the FALN’s most expert bomb maker.”

1972 1976 1980 1984 1988 1992

– Puerto Rican incidents – Arrests Figwe 6.1 Arrests of Puerto R~can terrorist5 and the decline of’puerto R a n

terrorism, 1969-92

A very different pattern is seen in the other two cases. The strong same-year correlations between the terrorist activity and law enforce- ment/crin~inal justice measures seen for both black and white racists is most easily explained as a response by the authorities. When there is a lot of terrorist activity, police arrest more terrorists, and the courts punish them more severely. In the case of the black militants. whose primary target was the police. the fact that more of them were killed by police during periods of increased terrorist activity is exactly what would be expected. This interpretation is supported by another fact. The Oklahoma City bombing was the worst terrorist atrocity to occur on American soil prior to September 1 1 . and as anticipated we find a statistically significant increase in arrests of. and sentences imposed on. white racist terrorists after that date. Specifically the aver- age annual nunlber of arrests prior to the Oklahon~a bombins was twelve compared with twenty for the years follo~ving the bombing. Similarly the average number of sentence years handed donm prior to the bombing n w e lower than in the years following (an annual a\.erage of 137 sentence years compared with 381 sentence years).”

Hon.e\:er, from a law enforcement criminal justice point of view. the important question is \v,llether these arrests and punishments suhse- q ~ r e ~ ~ r i ~ . reduced the level of violence’? To find out. the variables were lagpsd for one year. Hon-e?.er. no significant decline was observed in either white racist or black terrorism in the year after the arrests and punishments (which is consisrent with the previouslq. noted lack of any relationship between cumulative arrests and the level of violence). Indeed. the death sentences imposed on ~vhite racists were follon.ed by higher l e ~ t l s of violence. Why is this’? Why did not black terrorism and

103 De~rling with terrori.sts

white racist terrorism decline after large numbers of terrorists were arrested. as happened with Puerto Rican terrorism’! The answer lies in the fact that the terrorism was dirferent :~nd so were the arrests.

Unlike the Puerto Rican case. where terrorist org(ini:~ltiol~.s were responsible for planned campaigns, black terrorism – for the most part – was carried out by the violent fringe of an extremist movement. Although there were some organized terrorist groups such as the Black Liberation Army, the Black Panther Party per sr was not a terrorist organization, even though some of its members engaged in terrorist acts. Black terrorism was a largely unorganized – ;1Imost spontaneous – activity carried out by iunskilied anateurs. Furthermore, since the Black Panthers were arrested indiscriminately for minor offences. it could not be expected that the arrests w o ~ ~ l d have much effect.

The current wave of white racist terrorism seems to be even more amorphous. As with the black militants. we are dealing with an extremist movement that has a violent terrorist fringe. The concept of “leaderless resistance” has been xiopted by many right-wing extremists. so that several recent deadly attacks have been carried out by lone terrorists. who h~ive only the most tenuous links with any extremist organization. Timothy McVeigh is one notorious example, but several others come to mind. Right-wing extremists have not been harassed in the same way that militant black groups were. How- ever. as pointed out earlier. large numbers have been arrested for merely talking about engqing in terrorism. It is unlikely that such

7 ,

arrests will reduce or prevent terrorism.– Indeed. indiscriminate repression of extremist groups and indi-

viduals holding extremist opinions can be not merely ineffective but counterproductive. Terrorism is usually linked with a wider social movement. and the most valuable resource a terrorist group has is its ability to mobilize social support. To modify the Maoist slogan slightly. “a successf~~l terrorist must swim like a fish in a sea of popular support.” All successful terrorist campaigns depend on such popular support. The F.4LN and the Macheteros \vere vulnerable because they had only a small desree of support within the Puerto Rican community. On the other hand black militants had a high degree of support. and the support for contemporary right-wins extremists is not trivial.

People are often attracted to extremist movements because of what they perceive as brutality and injustice by the authorities. In Puerto Rico. the murder of two terrorists by police (the Cerro hlaravilla affair) became a major issue in the 1984 elections and increased support for the il~clepenclistns. After the trial and imprisonment of Huey Nexvton

for the murder o f a policeman, the Pan thers launched a “Free Huey” campaign. “Panther chapters were fo rmed in a score of cities a n d the membership surged t o perhaps two thousand” (Goodell 1973: 115). O n e reason why contemporary anti-govern men^ groups a re able to recruit a substantial membership is tha t many people believe that the sovernment has committed violent acts against its own citizens. A large number o f Americans believe that . : ~ t Waco . the FBI set f r e t o the Branch Davidians’ compound, o r sho t a t the Davidinns when they were trying t o escape the fire. A majority believe that the FBI lied a b o u t what happened a t W a c 0 (Boyer 1999). According t o most accounts, the Oklahoma City bombing by Timothy McVeigh was a n ac t o f revenge for what happened at ~ a c o . ” It is impor tan t t o remem- ber that lnaliy terrorist acts a r e intended t o send a message and t o change public opinion. Law enforcement efforts t o reduce terrorism r n ~ ~ s t be c a r e f ~ ~ l l y craited t o avoid increasing the alienation and hostility that many Americans currently feel towards the government.

Notes 1 For an account of the Meridian affair see Nelson (1993). Nelson (1993:

231) concludes that “at best the tactics had the earnmrks of entrapping the Klan members . . . the worst-case interpretation of the evidence was that the plan involved n death trap.”

2 Epstein esamincs the circumstances s ~ ~ r r o ~ ~ n d i n g the deaths of twenty- eight Panthers. and C O I I C I L I ~ ~ S th;tt there are no grounds for claiming. as many liberals did, that a pattern of police genocide existed.

3 In December 1999. Go\.ernos Pedro Rossello p~tblicly apologized to the victili~s of state spying and offered $5.000 to those whose ctnperrts exceeded fifty pages. In May 2000. the FBI acknowledged its in\olvement and released its surveillttnce files to House Represent:itive Jose Serrano (hlarino 1999).

4 1 considered arrests for marijuana possession as harassment. The high number of Panthers arrested for druss or regular street crimes is indicative of their ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~iat social bnckpround.

5 Predictably. this brought charses that the police had violated their civil rights. x l d a judpe issued an injunction against such police tactics (-‘Fear in the sti-ee~s of San Francisco” 1974).

6 F14nn and Gerilardt ( 1989: 44. 6’. 2 13) describe how FBI agents talked to his smployer in an attempt to have Robert hL;lthe\vs fired. 2nd how police stopped Da\.id Lane and confisc~lted leaflets from him. ‘.The> had broken no Ian. but polict like to let radic~ls know that the!. are being \vcltched.”

7 The incident had some strange features. According to the victim. after d r i ~ i n g past the compound. she do~tbled back towards the entr;lnce aftcr her son had accide~~tally dropped his \vallet out of the car n.indcm – then her car backfired. This was mistaken for gunfire and they were pursued and assaulted by the security guards (Claiborne 3000).

104 Derrling 11.itll terrorists

8 The SPLC is not the only group bringing civil suits against hate crimes. The Center for Constitutional Rights won a $535.000 judgement in 1982 against the Justice I<nights of the Klan on behalf of five black women injured cluring a shooting incident in Chattanooga. The center is currently bringing a suit against the World Church of the Creator after Benjamin Smith, an ex-member of the group, went on a shooting spree that left two dead and nine wouncied.

9 Columnist Jack Anderson claimed that the clean-cut FBI agents could not infiltrate the student s i~bc~dture ol’ “beards, beads. and bell bottoms.” but Jeffers (1973: 189) argues that the problem was the lack ofinhrmants will- ing to t r d e information for cash.

10 As Daley (1973: 85) points o ~ ~ t . this is true of crime in general. “Detective novels were one thing, real-life crime solving was something else. Crimes were solved by inl’ormants, not deduction.”

I I Details on the use 01’infi)1-111;1111~ ;~se ~~nderst;llid;~bly hard to come by. but interesting ; I C C O L ~ ~ ~ S c;~n be fot~nd in Volktnan (1980). Anthony (1990). Rosenthal (3000). and “Undercover Policeman” ( 1965: A l ) .

12. Rows was siding in the car with the Klansmen who shot and killed Mrs Liuzzo. The federal government was later sued by her children for not controlling Rowe’s violent activities.

13 According to Zimroth (1974: 49). the FBI had cornparati\dy poor intelli- gence ~ t b o ~ t the Panthers, and relied primarily upon paid informants. sonic of ~ I ~ o n i were very unreliable. and on local police departments. Attorney General Rumsey Clark estimated that during his tenure about 90 percent of the FBI’s intelligence ~tbout black militants came from local police departments.

14 Since our focus is on the conten~porary impact of law enforcement, this does not include cases in which terrorists were captured or convicted long after their terrorist x t s . Thus the ncent trials of Kathleen Soliah of the SLA. S;lm Bowers of the KKK. and Byron de la Becklvith (murderer of Medger Evers) for crimes comlnitted in the 1960s and 1970s are igored .

15 At his trial. it was reported that Salvi had delusions of a Masonic conspi- racy against Catholics. and wantsd the V~ltjcan to issue its own currency. He co~umitted suicide in prison. n.11er.e he nas reportedly “disheveled and babbliny.” and was denled medication for his condition (T . I ‘~ i . s / i i /~gro~~ Post Novenlbes 30. 1996).

16 Scarpa. n-ho nxs an informant for the FBI. and an FBI agent kidnaped the Klansman. Lalvrence Byrd. drove him to a nearb! military base. where Scxpil beat a confession out of him. “La\vrence ~vus a tough ~ L I ! – a big ru\v-boi~ed countr) boy – but he i v x beat up so bad ht was never the same ~ ~ f r e r that” (D~innen 1996: 71) .

17 According to Volknim (19SO: 156). the burtlau spent $7.4 niillion on infor- mants in their ivar against the Black Panthers. a sun1 tn-ice what the!. spent to obtain information on organized crime.

IS The inhrmation on the Defenders of Democracy was uncovered by a Puerto Rican Senate investigation (Weiner 1993).

19 Since the t\vo \.ariabIes are higlil); correlated with each other. and since the cumu1;rtive arrest \tlriable is ~1 bettsr predictor. it is the only one shown in T~tble 6.8.

Dmlitzg wirh terrorists 105

30 Fernandez (1957: 734-5) suggests n different explanation. Violence declined not because the Macheteros were “demoralized. fatally weakened. or frightened” but because t h e \+we concerned that further attacks would “adversely affect the plight of their imprisoned comrades.” Honever. if this were true. one wodd anticipate that ufter harsh sentences were handed down. there w o ~ d d have been a resumption of violence – which did not occur.

21 In order to compare average number of arrests and years sentenced before versus ufter the Oklahoma City bombing, independent I tests were calcu- lated: [/arrests (19) = – 1.755. p < 0.10: tisentence years (19) = -1.795, p < 1.0.

23 For example. of the twelve members of the Arizona Viper militia who were arrested. half were released on bond as posins no threat to society, and most charges against several defendants were dropped three months later (Suro 1998).

33 McVeigh had visited Waco during the siege, and apparently believed that the a s s a ~ ~ l t had been ordered from the ATF offices in the M ~ ~ r r a h Federal Building (Jones 1998: 57).